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Since the intended efTect of al} of the many military reforms introduced by Miliutin was to make the Tsarist army a more modern and more professionally competent institutionS it is reasonable to ask how these reforms afTected peasant conscripts. Was the Tsarist army a modernizing institutionw did it instill the habits of discipline and regularitys a sense of abstract order, an openness to changes an orientation toward the future and all those other traits we associate with modernity? Was service in the army at the least a qualitatively new experience for peasants, bringing them-even if against their will-into contact with a world beyond their villages?
It must be noted at the outset that after Miliutin's retirement in 1881 the army high command lost interest in educating soldiers, and many officers shared the feeling of their new chief, Vannovskii, that education was positively harmful. Junior officers who continued to think of themselves as educators were suspect and were occasionally ordered to cease teaching the rudiments of literacy to conscripts. While some peasants who came into the army with a semblance of literacy-reading newspapers rather than smoking them, as the saying wentdid receive further instruction if they were chosen to be NCO's, the mass of peasant soldiers left the army no more literate than they had entered it 4
FIowever, the lack of a program of formal education need not mean that the army failed to impart modern attitudes. The civilizing experience described by Col. Rittikh could proceed whether or not soldiers could read and write, and many officers shared Col. Rittikh's perception that military service in and of itself was an educational experience.5 At any ratez service in the army, with its formal hierarchy, its abstract rules and complex patterns of behaviors seems at first glance a world away from life in the village and might be presumed to have undermined the traditional mentality of peasant soldiers. Furthermore, in the late 19th century Dragornirov's precepts on training were gospel: soldiers were not simply to be drilled they were to be made to internalize military discipline, to think about and understand the rationale behind the military system.6 We might add that it was precisely in this period-from the 1880's on-that the army became a predominantly urban institution. While before, many regiments had been scattered about the countryside and soldiers quartered in peasant huts, units were now concentrated in the cities and housed in proper barracks.7 Military society thus became more self-contained, while what extra-military experience soldiers had was now urban rather than rural.
The case for modernization by way of military service can be taken one step farther: the conscript's initial experience in the army was utterly unlike anything he had ever known. During the first four months of service the conscript was immersed in an intensive process of military socialization. It was during this period that the soldier was taught, none too gentlyn to i'speakn look, turn and move with military precision,'5 that he memorized the intricate grammar of the military hierarchy, and that he was catechized on the duties of a soldier and the military virtues. It was in this period, too, that soldiers were introduced to the complete spectrum of the Tsarist army's vices-beatings, extortion by noncoms, outright theft, and so on. Naturally enough, this was for the conscript a time of extreme disorientation7 depression and homesickness, he frequentlx wasted away bodily, and occasionally maimed himself for the sake of a discharge. The severity of the psychologica} stress was proportionate to the abruptness of the transition from village to barracks. The conscript was well on the way to being modernized, or at least uprooted.
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At that point, however, the modernizing process-if that is what it wasended; of his initial military experience only the vices carried over in any mayor way to the remainder of the soldierss term of service. The case for sociopsychological modernization breaks down as soon as it becomes clear just how unmilitary life in the Tsarist army was. The soldier's duties, his byt, were functions of the economic rather than the properly military life of his unit. In fact, the Russian regiment's economic functions left little room for martial matters. Not only did the regiment cook its own food and bake its own bread; where possible it grew its own fruit and vegetables and even kept some cattle. The regiment produced its own uniforms and boots. (As of 1907, 150,000 soldiers-12 percent of all enlisted personnel-spent their duty hours tailoring.) All regiments produced or otherwise provided for themselves-at no cost to the governmentblankets, coats, valenki, utensils and other military accoutrement. Every regiment maintained a production complex-masterskie-staffed by soldiers permanently detailed to provide for its economic needs. However, soldiers from line companies as well did duty as tailors, cobblers, carpenters, carters, cooks, and gardeners. They also served as stable hands, singers, musicians, church attendants, batmen and lackeys in the officers' club. (If this incomplete list calls to mind the organization of a large estate before the emancipation, it should.) During the 8 or 9 months a regiment spent in its barracks, 40 or more of the 100-odd men in a company were performing these unsoldierly duties. Since most other soldiers were on guard duty or serving as duty orderlies, the total number of men free for the training that was called for in the regulations was low. One estimate put it at 1 or 2, rarely as many as 10. This figure is surely too low, but just as surely, after the first four months of intensive training, roughly half the strength of the company on any given day were on details that were in no way military, while most of the rest were simply standing guard. What military training a soldier received was episodic, and it is not difElcult to believe a report that a Russian soldier's military skills deteriorated the longer he was in the army.9
The unsoldierly life of the Tsarist soldier was due above all to the fact that, once provided with some working capital by the commissariat, regiments were expected to be economically self-sufficient. However, the commissariat was stingy, and the regiment's capital was insufficient to provide for its needs. The only resource the regiment had in excess was labor, so in order to make good the deficit in material soldiers were dispatched to earn money in the civilian economy, a practice known as " vol'nye raboW." General Dragomirov observed that In July enlisted personnel fan out in hay-mowing, in forests, along railway lines, in town for building; they sew clothing; they acquire an external aspect entirely unsuitaMe [for military service], they become unaccustomed to discipline and lose their military bearing.
The soldiers' migratory labor was so obviously detrimental to the army's military mission that there was frequent discussion of ending the practice. Yet as one officer noted, his men needed blankets, the blankets had to be paid for, and the only recourse was to collect the money soldiers earned at their civilian work. Vol 'nye rabotwere built into the military economy.
If the money earned through migratory labor balanced the regimental budget, it did not entirely balance the individual soldier's budget. Prior to 1906, soldiers were required to provide their own soap, spoons, boot brushes and polish, oil and rags for cleaning rifles, bed linen, shirts, in many instances blankets, and on and on. Equipment that was issued to the soldiers was so inadequate that considerable expense was involved in keeping it up to specifications. Army-issue boots, for journal of social history 568 instance, were of such poor quality that they lasted no more than three months. Soldiers had either to purchase their own or pay for repairs-and repairs, even if performed by the company cobbler, could easily cost the soldier as much as four rubles a year-yet before 1906 soldiers were paid only 2r. 70k. a year. The soldier's minimum monthly budget ranged anywhere from 90k. to lr. 74k. a year. However calculateds it far exceeded his monthly pay of 22l/zk. (raised to 50k. per month as of January 1906).12 Soldiers were allowed to keep for themselves some of the money from their vol'nye rabott roughly half the soldiers received money from home; and in addition soldiers sold part of their daily bread ration to civilians, this providing up to 30 extra kopeks per month.l3 In any event, in addition to the regiment's involvement in the civilian economy, soldiers as individuals were also peripheral participants in the market.
It should be evident by now that as an economic entity the Tsarist regiment functioned in a way quite familiar to the peasant soldier. Like the peasant household and village, the Tsarist regiment aspired to self-sufficiency, but was bound up in a larger market system. Individual soldiers sold what surplus they had in order to cover the expense of maintaining their military household. But since the regiments marketable surplus was meager soldiers joined the migratory labor force and sent their earnings "home."
The similarity between the peasant and military economy extended to the seasonality of the military-economic cycle. Units set off for their summer encampments in early May. Field exercises-the most exhausting part of the yearly cycle-were over by the end of July or early August. At that point, soldiers who had completed their term were discharged from service, others were given home leave, and most of the rest went off in search of civilian work. The regiment withered from 1800 to roughly 300 men, with no more than 20 present in a company. Military duties were supposed to resume in mid-October, but with soldiers off doing one thing or another no start could be made until midNovember-at which point end-of-the-year holidays intervened. What training there was during the winter was confined to the four months between the new year and the onset of field exercises-but as we have seen, trainin8 was hardly regular even then.14 Not only was military life as cyclical as peasant lifer the modulations of the two cycles were virtually identical.
Relations between offlcers and mens too, were congruent with the peasant experience. It was not just that ofElcers thought of their men as the rude peasants they had been prior to service though this was an important element of the overall pattern. Denikin remarked in 1903 that ofElcers just could not conceive of their soldiers as fellow men.ls This attitude came through most clearly in the distinction ofElcers drew between ordinary conscripts and the educated volunteers: striking a simple soldier was a matter of course, but it was unthinkable to strike a volunteer who came from a social world much like the ofElcerss own and might actually file charges. The simple soldier was quite aware of his inferior standings which was entirely independent of his subordinate position in the military hierarchy. That he could be beaten was as natural to him as it was to his officer. Soldiers drew the line only at offlcers from other companies-their own ofElcers could strike thems but the barin from another company who did so was violating the social proprieties. 16 These attitudes were of course reminiscent of the master-serf relationship, but they were rooted more in the socio-economic reality of the unit than in tradition. The structure of which such attitudes were a part was most exposed to view in the vol'nye rabot. General Dragomirov commented that PEASANTS IN UNIFORM 569 so-called 'icivilian work" is in essence forced labors with overtones of serfdom. Formerly the pomeshchik hired out his own peasants, now the military commander does the same . . . Such an application of authority sometiWes leads to an individuat who does not want to do civilian work being courtmartialed.
Another ofElcer added that not only did vol'nye raboW"accustom the commander to view his men as serfs, from this it is not far to the use of soldiers as free labor.''l8 And indeed, officers employed their men not only to sustain the unit, but also for personal labor and other services. The attitude of ofElcers toward the regimental shops was frankly proprietary: outfitting an apartment with new table, desk and curtains was as simple as issuing an order. Setting soldiers to constructing comfortable summer cottages at the regimental camp was just as easy. In Saratov in the early 20th century, one enterprising regimental commander ran a funeral procession business, employing in this enterprise the men and horses of his unit. Less imaginative officers merely used their men as household labor. 19 Like peasants, soldiers were at the mercy of the strong of the world, and the world was one in which formal regulations against striking soldiers or exploiting them for economic gain-formal regulations of any kind-were irrelevant. Custom alone counted, and Tsarist military custom was weighted heavily against the soldier. Yet the soldier's peasant persona was more deeply rooted in military society than that. Even where regimental custom conformed to military regulations, the ordinary functioning of the unit recalled for the soldier the familiar peasant world. The ofElcer was not just the soldier's military superior, he was simultaneously master of the unit's economy. If nothing else, this was a situation ripe for abuse. There was ample opportunity-indeed, necessity-for ofElcers to divert money intended for provisioning soldiers to other needs of the unit, or to their own pockets. (To the soldier, of course, it made no difference whether money meant to purchase their food was gambled away by the company commander or was spent repairing barracks.) Furthermore, whether or not officers were in fact "stealing" from their men, they could be doing so, and it was impossible for soldiers to complain-because the ofElcers' economic functions were vested in their authority as military superiors. This may seem a minor point. But if officers had had primarily military functions, if they had not controlled the finances for feeding and clothing their mens if they had not allocated their men to production duties, they would not automatically have been perceived to be living at the expense of the soldiers. (As one contemporary observer put it delicately, the fact that the officer's military and economic functions were indivisible undermined his moral authority.) As things stood, there was nothing more natural than for soldiers to view their ofElcers as economic drones, or at least as competitors for scarce goods.20 Certainly, of}lcers alone were not responsible for this situation-in the military economy was in fact one of scarcity. Yet the socioeconomic pattern that derived from the army's scarcity economy could only reinforce the prototypically peasant "image of limited good." Given the economic reality of peasant (and military) life, one man's gain was indeed another's loss. While this image was obviously congruent with the distribution of material goods it also held-in the peasant's view-for the distribution of psychic goods.21 Since the image of limited good was fundamental to the peasant way of looking at the world and was reinforced by life in the army, it is scarcely credible that military service could have done much to reshape the peasant mentality.
Officers, then, employed their peasant soldiers to maintain the regimental estate and to benefit themselves, and if they did not, no matter-soldiers 570 journal of social history suspected them of doing so. To complete the picture of the army as a peasant society, it remains only to consider the officer's role as outsider, a role that was, again, built into the daily routine of military life. The fact is that officers, junior ofElcers included, spent very little time with their men. Much of their time was given over either to management and related paperwork, or to verification of the management of other officers. Officers sat on countless commissions that checked the books of the various economic subunits, revolving funds and permanent capital that made up the regimental economy. OSlcers were rated more for their proficiency as economic managers than for their ability to train and lead menwhich, given the predominance of the regiment's economic functions, was logical enough. Little wonder, thens that the road to success lay through the company and regimental off1ces. It was there that junior off1cers came to the attention of their superiors, it was there that they could perform services genuinely useful to the regiment and its commander and could hope to reap a suitable reward. Whether or not their formal duties called for them to be in the offices that was where they congregated at every opportunity. It was anyhow boring to spend time with soldiers, much more interesting to be involved in the social life centered on the ofElces. Little wonder, again, that a company commander's contact with his men was ordinarily limited to a cursory look-through (and that not every day), or that lieutenants-when forced into the barracks against their will-idled on the sidelines, smoking, gossiping and telling jokes.22 Lack of contact between officers and men was certainly detrimental to training, but then a regiment's economic functions had priority. Since the economic life of the unit was routine only routine dispositions had to be made.
If officers were distant, periodically intrusive figures, who was in day-to-day charge of the men? Obviously, the NCO's. However, after the Miliutin reforms the Tsarist army had proportionately fewer long-term NCO's than any other European army, because few soldiers reenlisted after completing their appointed term. From the 1880's on, there were at most the company Sgt. Major and perhaps one or two long-term senior sergeants-but only perhaps. All the other non-com slots were filled by literate conscripts given some extra training, but only on the company roster could these be distinguished from privates. The Sgt. Major was certainly the most important authority with whom soldiers regularly came intocontact, but he-was the only authority with whom they were in regular contact. The Sgt. Major kept no closer track of the men under him than was necessary to satisfy the company commander, or alternatively grossly abused his authority because the company commander had so little knowledge of what went on in the unit.
Mostly, in fact, soldiers were left to themselves, the Sgt. Major merely maintaining a patina of proper military order and discipline Since soldiers were more or less free to organize themselves, it is not at all surprising that they fell back on the type of social organization that Russian peasants away from their villages had employed for centuries, the artel' (The recrudescence of familiar civilian patterns was made all the easier by the fact that most soldiers in a unit weres due to the recruiting system, zemliaki-Landsleute-often from the same or neighboring villages.) The company chose an artel'shchik who was responsible for purchasing food and sundry other of the soldiers' necessities with funds provided by the company commander, and it was the self-constituted soldier artelJ that concluded contracts for vol'nye rabo@.24 It seemed so natural to the soldiers that they should manage their own afEairs-because that was their experience as peasantsl and because that was the norm in the army-that invariably the most PEASANTS IN UNIFORM 571 detested offlcers were those who actually attempted to supervise their men. It was the very principle of ofElcer intrusion in the barracks that soldiers resented, not the results. It made no difTerence that units in which officers played an active supervisory role were the best clothed, the best shod and the best fed. Soldiers preferred-and performed best for-the ofElcer who let his upit run itself, even if they suffered some privation in consequence.25 In the soldiers' view, the off1cer's proper role was that of an outsider-the improving ofElcer was as much resented as the improving landlord.
Yet the Tsarist oiMlcer was not simply an outsider, he was a mediating outsider, a necessary part of the soldier's world. Only he could provide the link between the relatively autonomous, unit-level soldier community and the larger military world. And like mediating outsiders in peasant society, the Tsarist officer combined in his person the roles of socio-political middle man, economic intermediary, intercessor, and patron.26 In anthropological terms, the relationship between officer and soldier was multiplex rather than single-interest (i.e., specialized) -a distinction in modes of authority that has been called the watershed between traditional and modern society.27
Other analogies can be found between peasant and military societiesw but surely enough has been said to demonstrate that the Tsarist army was not a modernizing institution. In defiance of formal tables of organization and the prescriptions of training manualss the soldier's socio-economic experience replicated that of peasant society, the similarity extending even to types of contact with the nonpeasant (or non-military) world. Though the army had on paper a hierarchy of command and discipline that had no analogue in peasant society, in practice the pattern of ofElcer-soldier relations was familiar-even if by the late l9th century it was somewhat archaic by civilian standards. The peasant remained a peasant even while in uniform. This is not to say that service in the army had no impact on individual Russian peasants. The peasant soldier wass after all, stationed far from home and in an urban environment. Still, this sort of contact with the modern urban world was itself part of the Russian peasant's ordinary experience. Millions of peasants in the late l9th and early 20th centuries were engaged in migratory seasonal labor (and had been for generations), and other millions were engaged in non-seasonal, but temporary, labor in the cities. Yet the urban setting had a muted impact on peasant migrants, because urban peasants had traditional social institutions that set them apart from the city proper.28 If the urban peasant was in but not of the city, how much truer must this have been of the peasant soldier, whose urban experience was mediated by the peasant structure of his military unit? Whatever new experience came to the peasant soldier while in the army was being more efElciently acquired by other peasants in the civilian world. As all contemporaries reported, it was the returned peasant migrant who brought change to the village not the ex-soldier. In the final analysis, then, answering the question posed at the outset-was the Tsarist army a modernizing institution-does not contribute very much to our understanding of socio-cultural change in the Russian peasantry. It has, however, been a useful way to get at what a soldiers life in the Tsarist army was really like. This in turn throws some light on other aspects of Tsarist military experience, and suggests new approaches to some old issues. These can only be briefly adumbrated here.
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We are in a better position, firsts to understand the behavior of the Tsarist army during periods of civil turmoil. For instance, the mutinies of 190S and 1906 exhibited similarities at a number of levels to contemporaneous peasant disturbances. Allowing for differences in the organizational framework within which they occurred, mutinies and peasant disturbances had a very similar internal dynamic-the way they started, and the way they worked themselves out. They coincided, too, in their timing (responding to the same external stimuli) and in their frequency curves (they peaked at roughly the same time both in 1905 and 1906). Finallys the ultimate objects of mutiny and peasant riot were similar. Given what we know of soldier society, it would be strange if it had been otherwise -yet the mutinies have ordinarily been treated as political demonstrations, or as responses to military conditions narrowly construed. 29 We may also be in a better position to understand the Russian soldierzs performance in battle. Russian soldiers were renowned for their endurance and bravery-for their stolidity-but were also renowned for their lack of initiative and their tendency to deteriorate into a helpless herd as soon as their ofElcers were put out of action.30 The virtues of the Russian soldier were characteristic of peasant society. His defects, too, were rooted in peasant social organization, which was entirely inappropriate on the battlefield. A Tsarist military unit was cohesive so long as its off1cers were present-but a unit without officers had lost not just its appointed leaders, it had lost as well its intermediary to the world beyond the unit. On the battlefield, Russian soldiers without officers were not so much militarily as socially isolated. They had no sense of being part of an integrated military machine, nor could they have, since this was not their peacetime experience. Soldiers without ofElcers had no more notion of how to comport themselves than would a Russian village suddenly materialized in the midst of a battle.
Finallys what has been said of soldier society suggests a number of ways to approach the Tsarist ofElcer corps. In the final analysiss soldier society was what it was because officers permitted it to be so. OfElcer society was functionally complementary to soldier society, and not just in the way I suggested earlier; a more detailed analysis of this aspect of the officer corps would be well worth the while. It has, for instance, recently been suggested that many of the ills of the Tsarist army on the eve of World War I can be attributed to uncontrolled rivalry among cliques of generals (the generals' inability to coordinate their activities also made itself felt prior to and during the Russo-Japanese War), which negated otherwise beneficial military reforms.32 Clearly rivalry between high-ranking cliques was only one of several end products of the functioning of the Tsarist military system. Furthermorel the reforms hastily enacted after the RUSSQJapanese War failed not because of accidental personal rivalry, but because they were incompatible with the reality of the Tsarist army-they were obliterated by self-perpetuating (officer-perpetuated) military routine. And just as there was a connection between the soldiers' peacetime experience and battlefield performance, there must certainly have been such a connection for the ofElcer corps. Indeeds a few military commentators after the Russo-Japanese War placed the blame for defeat squarely on habits acquired by officers in the course of their economic chores.33 In any events to appreciate properly the service habits of Tsarist ofElcers in peace and war, we need a structural-if you will, an anthropological-analysis of the officer corps much like that offered here for enlisted personnel. 
